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We present a feasible method that can make quantum key distribution (QKD) both ultra-long-distance
and immune to all attacks in the detection system. This method is called measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) with entangled photon sources in the middle. By proposing a model and simulating a
QKD experiment, we find that MDI-QKD with one entangled photon source can tolerate 77dB loss (367km
standard fiber) in the asymptotic limit and 60dB loss (286km standard fiber) in the finite-key case with
state-of-the-art detectors. Our general model can also be applied to other non-QKD experiments involving
entanglement and Bell state measurements.
The global quantum internet1 is believed to be the
next-generation information processing platform promis-
ing an exponentially speed-up computation2 and a secure
means of communication. The long-distance distribution
of quantum states is a key ingredient for such a global
platform, and recently, it has attracted significant scien-
tific attention3,4. Among the applications of global quan-
tum internet, quantum key distribution (QKD)5,6 has
been identified as the first technology in quantum infor-
mation science to reach practical applications. Tremen-
dous effort has been dedicated to creating a global QKD
network during the past decade7–9. Nonetheless, a real-
life QKD network is still limited by two important factors
– performance and security.
For performance, long-distance QKD remains challeng-
ing. In experiment, the maximal transmission distances
are 200km through standard telecom fiber for the decoy-
state BB84 protocol10,11 and 144km through free space
for the entanglement based QKD12. In theory, the decoy-
state BB84 protocol with excellent detectors can tolerate
a maximal loss of around 50 dB in the asymptotic limit of
an infinitely long key13; in practice, however, the finite-
key effect14 of the data transmission will substantially
lower the tolerable loss, e.g., to less than 35 dB15. On the
other hand, the entanglement based QKD with sophis-
ticated post-processing can in principle tolerate higher
losses of 70 dB in the asymptotic limit and around 50
dB in the case of a finite key16 (also, a more rigorous
finite-key analysis will further decrease the tolerable loss
to less than 40 dB15). Nevertheless, we remark that all
the above schemes are vulnerable to various detector side-
channel attacks (see discussion below).
For security, the unconditional security of QKD has
been rigorously proved based on the laws of quantum me-
chanics17–20. However, real-life implementations of QKD
may contain overlooked imperfections, which are miss-
ing in the theoretical model of security proofs. By ex-
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ploiting these imperfections, especially those in detectors,
researchers have demonstrated various quantum attacks
including time-shift attack21, phase-remapping attack22,
detector-control attack23–27, detector dead-time attack28
and others29,30. These attacks suggest that quantum
hacking has become a major problem for the real-life se-
curity of QKD. Although device-independent QKD31,32
offers a nearly perfect solution to the quantum hacking
problem, it is not practical because it requires near-unity
detection efficiency and even then generates an extremely
low key rate33.
In contrast, Lo, Curty and Qi have recently proposed
the novel idea of measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD)34, which not only removes all quantum at-
tacks in the detection part, the most important secu-
rity loophole of QKD implementations21–23,27–29, but
also offers excellent performance with current technol-
ogy. Therefore, MDI-QKD has attracted a lot of sci-
entific attention from the research community on both
theoretical35–39 and experimental40–42 studies.
In a general MDI-QKD scheme (see Fig. 1), each of Al-
ice and Bob locally prepares quantum states, via photons,
according to the phase randomized decoy-state BB84
protocol43–45 and sends them via a quantum channel to
an untrusted quantum relay, Charles (or Eve), who is sup-
posed to perform quantum measurements and broadcast
his/her measurement results. Since the measurement de-
vice in MDI-QKD is essentially used to post-select entan-
glement between Alice and Bob34, it can be treated as a
true black box, which indicates that MDI-QKD is nat-
urally immune to all detection loopholes. This is a ma-
jor achievement as MDI-QKD allows legitimate users to
not only perform secure quantum communications with
untrusted relays46 but also out-source the manufactur-
ing of detectors to untrusted manufactures. Notice that
detectors are often the most technologically demanding
components of a QKD system7, whereas sources can be
simple lasers that could be made compact and low-cost47.
The original MDI-QKD34 considers a simple setting
where Alice and Bob employ weak coherent pulses for
state preparation and Charles uses a Bell state measure-
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2ment (BSM) for quantum measurement. It can be eas-
ily implemented with standard optical components and
thus experimental attempts have been made by several
groups40–42. Nevertheless, even in the asymptotic case,
the initial protocol can only tolerate a maximal loss of 50
dB, which imposes a limit on the transmission distance
within 238km for standard telecom fiber.
In this paper, we propose an important extension
of MDI-QKD, called MDI-QKD with entangled pho-
ton sources in the middle. This method is a detector-
loophole-free and ultra-long-distance QKD protocol,
which is highly compatible to the future applications
of network-centric quantum communications47, as the
entangled photon sources together with the BSM de-
vices (in the middle) in this method can be totally un-
trusted. In particular, we analyze one specific case in
which the quantum relay is composed of one entangled
photon source and two BSMs. This scheme is simple,
experimentally feasible, and most importantly, it enables
us to implement QKD over significantly longer distance
than what is possible with any existing proposal in the
literature.
Fig. 2 illustrates the diagram of MDI-QKD with one
entangled photon source in the middle. This method is
similar to the original MDI-QKD in that David, Ethan
and Charles together can be treated as an untrusted re-
lay. Hence, the model and security analysis are nearly
equivalent. Note that this analysis is also applicable to
the case of multiple entangled photon sources combined
with multiple BSMs in the middle.
The protocol is as follows. Each of Alice and Bob pre-
pares phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCP) in
one of the four BB84 polarization states5 randomly and
independently. They also randomly modulate the aver-
age photon number in each pulse to implement the decoy-
state method43–45. Meanwhile, an untrusted source,
Charles, prepares polarization entangled photon pairs us-
ing a Type II parametric-down-conversion (PDC) source
(ideally, producing Singlet |ψ−〉= 1√
2
(|H,V 〉−|V,H〉). All
three parties send quantum signals to two untrusted re-
lays, David and Ethan, each of whom is supposed to per-
form a BSM that projects the incoming signals into a Bell
state (either Singlet |ψ−〉 or Triplet |ψ+〉= 1√
2
(|H,V 〉 +
|V,H〉). Here, Alice and Bob can use the decoy-state
method to estimate the single-photon contributions36–39,
i.e., estimate the counts and the error rates when both
Alice and Bob send out single-photon pulses and both
David and Ethan report successful events.
In the classical communication phase, each of David
and Ethan uses a classical channel to broadcast their
measurement results. Alice and Bob keep the success-
ful events (i.e., the event when both David and Ethan
achieve successful BSMs), discard the rest and post-select
the events where they use the same basis. Finally, as
shown in Table I, either Alice or Bob applies a bit flip
to her or his data according to their basis and the BSM
results.
For post-processing, Alice and Bob evaluate the data
sent in two bases separately48. The Z -basis (rectilinear)
is used for key generation, while the X -basis (diagonal)
is used for testing against tampering and the purpose of
quantifying the amount of privacy amplification needed.
In the Z -basis, an error corresponds to a successful event
when Alice and Bob prepare the same quantum states;
in the X -basis, an error corresponds to a projection into
|ψ−ψ−〉 or |ψ+ψ+〉 when they prepare the same states,
or, into |ψ+ψ−〉 or |ψ−ψ+〉 when they prepare orthogonal
states (see Table I). The secure key rate in the asymptotic
case (i.e., with an infinite number of transmission signals
and decoy states) is given by34
R = Q1,1Z [1−H2(e1,1X )]−QZfe(EZ)H2(EZ) (1)
where QZ and EZ denote, respectively, the gain and
quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the Z basis; fe ≥ 1 is
the error correction inefficiency function and in this pa-
per, we assume fe = 1.16; Q
1,1
Z and e
1,1
X are the gain and
error rate when both Alice and Bob send single-photon
states. In practice, QZ and EZ are directly measured
from experiments, while Q1,1Z and e
1,1
X can be estimated
from the finite decoy-state method38,39.
To evaluate the performance of our protocol, we pro-
vide a general approach to model the system. Although
the model is proposed to study MDI-QKD, it is also
useful for other non-QKD experiments involving entan-
glement and BSMs2,49. In this model, the source is a
composite of two weak coherent states prepared by Al-
ice and Bob and one EPR state (Singlet) prepared by
Charles; The polarization rotations (i.e., polarization
misalignments) and losses of the transmissions of the four
quantum channels (i.e., Alice to David, Bob to Ethan,
Charles to David and Ethan) are respectively modelled
by four unitary matrices2 and four beam-splitters; The
measurement is realized by two BSMs, each of which con-
tains a typical Hong-Ou-Mandel interference50, followed
by threshold detections51. Finally, we can derive all the
terms in Eq. (A1). The details of our model are shown
in the supplementary material52.
In simulation, the polarization misalignments of the
four quantum channels are assumed to be identical, and
the four channel transmittances are optimized by max-
imizing the key rates. Firstly, we simulate the key rate
in the asymptotic case using the practical parameters
from the entanglement based QKD experiment reported
in Ref.12. This result is shown by the red solid curve
in Fig. 3. As a comparison, we also present the simula-
tion result of the original MDI-QKD34 in this figure (see
the blue dashed curve). It is interesting that MDI-QKD
with one PDC source in the middle can tolerate signif-
icantly higher loss, up to 77 dB. Notice that with the
same practical parameters, the decoy-state BB84 proto-
col, however, can only tolerate around 30 dB16. Without
other losses, a 77 dB loss corresponds to a channel trans-
mission of 367km standard telecom fiber (0.21 dB/km)
or 481km ultra-low loss telecom fiber (0.16 dB/km53).
It is worth noting that in Fig. 3, the optimal key rate
of MDI-QKD with one PDC source at 0km is about
32.39 × 10−8 bits per pulse. Why is this key rate lower
than the original MDI-QKD? It is due to two factors:
1) MDI-QKD with one PDC source requires 4-fold co-
incidence, whereas the original MDI-QKD requires only
2-fold coincidence; Hence, the low detector efficiency here
(14.5%) inherently decreases the key rate by around two
orders of magnitude. 2) If the PDC source in the middle
presents a large brightness, its multi-photon pairs con-
tribute significantly to the QBER. Consequently, the op-
timal brightness of this PDC source is on the order of
10−3.
The result in Fig. 3 can be significantly improved if we
consider state-of-the-art single-photon detectors (SPD).
For instance, using the practical parameters of Ref.54
with detector efficiency of 93% and dark-count rate (per
gating window) of 1×10−6, the simulation result is shown
in Fig. 4. Remarkably, it shows that our scheme can tol-
erate 140 dB loss (667km standard fiber) in the asymp-
totic limit. The optimal brightness of PDC is still on the
order of 10−3. To address the finite-key effect, we simu-
late the finite-key rate by blue dash-dotted and red solid
curves in this figure. Here we use the method reported
in Ref.39 for a rigorous finite-key analysis including an
analytical approach38 with two decoy states for the finite
decoy-state protocol, a data-size of N=1015 and a secu-
rity bound of =10−10 for the finite-key analysis. In this
case, our scheme can tolerate up to 60 dB channel loss
(286km standard fiber or 375km ultra-low loss fiber).
The ultimate transmission distance is limited by the
low system operation rate, i.e., the speed of experimen-
tal devices. For instance, at 100 dB, even in the asymp-
totic case, the optimal key rate is only 3× 10−15. Thus,
to get one secure bit requires 30 hours of continuous ex-
periment with a high-speed QKD system working at 10
GHz. Note that achieving such high-speed system is cur-
rently one of the primary goals of experimental quantum
communication community. On the other hand, similar
to classical optical communication, a quantum repeater49
can be helpful for an ultra-long distance quantum com-
munication.
In summary, we have presented a feasible method of
MDI-QKD with entangled photon sources in the middle.
This method is simple, experimentally feasible, and
most importantly, it enables us to implement detection-
loophole-free QKD over ultra-long distances. Our
work is relevant to not only QKD but also general ex-
periments involving entangled photon sources and BSMs.
We thank enlightening discussions with M. Curty,
W. Cui, S. Gao, D. Kang, L. Qian, C. Weedbrook and
F. Ye. Support from funding agencies NSERC and the
CRC program is gratefully acknowledged. F. Xu would
like to thank the Paul Biringer Graduate Scholarship for
the financial support.
TABLE I. Successful Bell state measurements.
David&Ethan |ψ+ψ+〉 |ψ−ψ−〉 |ψ+ψ−〉 |ψ−ψ+〉
Alice/Bob Z -basis flip flip flip flip
Alice/Bob X -basis flip flip non-flip non-flip
Alice Bob 
Charles/Eve 
FIG. 1. A general MDI-QKD diagram. Each of Alice
and Bob locally prepares quantum states in the decoy-state
BB84 protocol and sends them via a quantum channel to
an untrusted quantum relay, Charles (or Eve), who performs
quantum measurements and broadcasts his/her measurement
results. In a general setting, Alice and Bob can use various
quantum sources such as a weak-coherent-pulse (WCP) or a
parametric-down-conversion (PDC) source, while Charles can
perform any general quantum measurement to establish corre-
lations on the information between Alice and Bob. The origi-
nal MDI-QKD34 considers a simple and practically achievable
setting where Alice and Bob employ WCP as the source and
Charles uses a Bell state measurement (BSM) for quantum
measurement.
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FIG. 2. MDI-QKD with one entangled photon source
in the middle. WCP: weak coherent pulse; EPR: Type II
parametric-down-conversion source; M: polarization and in-
tensity modulators; BS: beam splitter; D: single photon de-
tector (SPD); PBS: polarization beam splitter (in the ideal
case without any polarization misalignment, the Z basis, used
for key generation in Eq. (A1), refers to the basis of PBS).
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FIG. 3. Asymptotic key rate. Asymptotic limit means
that Alice and Bob have an infinite number of signals and
decoy states. The practical parameters are from an entan-
glement based QKD experiment12: the detection efficiency is
14.5%, the background count rate is 6.02× 10−6, and the in-
trinsic error rate due to misalignment and instability of the
system is 3% (owing to 4-channel links in Fig. 2 instead of
2 links in Ref.12, the total misalignment error is assumed to
be roughly twice as that in Ref.12.). In the low and medium
channel loss regions, since MDI-QKD with one PDC source re-
quires 4-fold coincident detections instead of 2-fold coincident
detections required by the original MDI-QKD, its key rate is
lower than that of the original MDI-QKD. However, MDI-
QKD with one PDC source can tolerate significantly higher
losses up to 77 dB (367km standard telecom fiber).
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FIG. 4. Key rate with state-of-the-art SPDs. We con-
sider better SPDs with detecter effiency of 93% and dark
count rate of 1 × 10−6. The other experimental parameters
are the same as those used in Fig. 3. In the asymptotic limit,
MDI-QKD with one PDC source can tolerate significantly
higher losses, up to 140 dB (667km standard fiber). With the
method of Ref.38,39, the finite-key analysis is conducted on a
data-size of N=1015. MDI-QKD with one PDC source can
tolerate 60 dB loss (286km standard fiber) in the finite-key
case.
Appendix A: Model
We discuss our general approach to model the system
of MDI-QKD with one PDC source in the middle. The
asymptotic key rate is given by
R = Q1,1Z [1−H2(e1,1X )]−QZfe(EZ)H2(EZ) (A1)
In what follows, we discuss how one can derive each quan-
tity in this key rate formula, i.e., Q1,1Z , e
1,1
X , QZ and EZ .
1. Preliminary
Notations:: µa (µb) is the mean photon number of Al-
ice’s (Bob’s) coherent state; µc is the expected
photon pairs of Charlie’s PDC source; µopta (µ
opt
b ,
µoptc ) is the optimized µ that maximizes the key
rate; Lad and ta (Lbe and tb) denote, respectively,
the channel distance and transmittance from Alice
(Bob) to David (Ethan). For a fiber-based system,
ta=10
−αLad/10 with α denoting the channel loss co-
efficient; Similarly, Lcd and td (Lce and te) denote
the ones from Charles to David (Ethan); ηd is the
detector efficiency and Y0 is the dark-count rate; ed
denotes the total polarization misalignment error.
Misalignment:: In our simulation, for simplicity, we
consider a 2-dimensional unitary matrix to repre-
sent the polarization rotation (or misalignment) of
each channel transmission. Notice that this uni-
tary matrix is a simple form rather than the gen-
eral one2. Nonetheless, we believe that the re-
sult for a more general unitary transformation will
be similar to our simulation results. This uni-
tary matrix is given by Uk=
(
cos θk − sin θk
sin θk cos θk
)
with k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. {U1, U2, U3, U4} denotes the
misalignments for the channels of {Lad, Lcd, Lce,
Lbe} respectively. The misalignment error, edk,
is defined as edk = sin
2 θk. Since the misalign-
ment error is relatively independent of the chan-
nel distance, we assume that edk is equal with
each other, thus edk=
ed
4 . We also assume that θk
is randomly distributed in {−θmaxk ,+θmaxk } with
θmaxk = arcsin(
√
edk). We remark that our model
is a simple extension of our previous model38 used
in MDI-QKD without entangled photon sources.
2. Source
WCP: The output from an attenuated laser is a weak-
coherent state |α〉 that is a superposition of number
states (Fock states). Assuming that the phase of the
laser is totally randomized for each pulse, the photon
number of each pulse follows a Poison distribution with
a parameter µ=|α|2 as its mean photon number. Hence,
5the density matrix of the weak-coherent state is given by
ρ =
1
2pi
2pi∫
0
dθ||α|eiθ〉〈|α|eiθ|
=
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
e−µ|n〉〈n|
(A2)
where θ is the phase of the state and |n〉〈n| is the density
matrix of the n-photon state.
EPR: The state emitted from a type-II PDC source
can be written as55
|Ψ〉 = (coshχ)−2
∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 1 tanhn χ|Φn〉, (A3)
where |Φn〉 is the state of an n-photon pair, given by
|Φn〉 = 1√
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
(−1)m|n−m,m〉d ⊗ |m,n−m〉e.
The probability of an n-photon pair is P (n)= (n+1)λ
n
(1+λ)n+2 ,
where λ=sinh2 χ. The expected number (brightness) of
photon pairs per pump pulse is µ=2λ.
Here, we use the polarization modes as the qubit ba-
sis. Specifically, in Z -basis, |m,n〉 represents m photons
in |H〉 mode (horizontal) and n photons in |V 〉 mode
(vertical); while in X -basis, |m,n〉 represents m photons
in |+〉 mode (45) and n photons in |−〉 mode (135).
3. Transmission
Suppose Alice, Bob, and Charles send out states |αa〉,
|αb〉 (Eq. (A2)) and |Ψc〉 (Eq. (A3)) respectively. After
channel transmission, the source states evolve to
|αa〉 → |α′a〉 =
∞∑
xa=0
∞∑
ya=0
Ca|xa, ya〉
|αb〉 → |α′b〉 =
∞∑
xb=0
∞∑
yb=0
Cb|xb, yb〉
|Ψc〉 → |φc〉 =
∞∑
xd=0
∞∑
yd=0
∞∑
xe=0
∞∑
ye=0
Cc|xd, yd, xe, ye〉(A4)
where x and y denote the number of photons in |H〉 and
|V 〉 mode respectively and C denotes the final coefficient
associated with channel loss and misalignment. In the
following, we discuss how one can derive Ca, Cb and Cc.
WCP: Suppose Alice and Bob send out coherent states
both in |H〉 mode, after channel transmission with trans-
mittance {ta, tb} and misalignment angle {θ1, θ4}, the
resulting density matrices can be written as
|ρ′a〉 = e−µata
∞∑
na=0
na∑
ma=0
(µata)
na
na!
(
na
ma
)
(cos2 θ1)
ma ×
(sin2 θ1)
(na−ma)|ma, na −ma〉〈ma, na −ma|
|ρ′b〉 = e−µbtb
∞∑
nb=0
nb∑
mb=0
(µbtb)
nb
nb!
(
nb
mb
)
(cos2 θ4)
mb ×
(sin2 θ4)
nb−mb |mb, nb −mb〉〈mb, nb −mb|
where m (n-m) denotes the number of photons in |H〉
(|V 〉) mode. Hence, we can derive the coefficients Ca
and Cb (Eq. (A4)).
EPR: Let us start from a general state |Ψ〉 emitted by
Charles. After channel transmission {td, te}, the result-
ing state is
(coshχ)−2
∞∑
nc=0
tanhnc χ
nc∑
mc=0
(−1)mc{[
mc∑
kd=0
nc−mc∑
(ld−kd)=0
√(
nc −mc
ld − kd
)(
mc
kd
)
×
(
√
td)
ld(
√
1− td)nc−ld |ld − kd, kd〉d]
⊗[
mc∑
ke=0
nc−mc∑
(le−ke)=0
√(
nc −mc
le − ke
)(
mc
ke
)
×
(
√
te)
le(
√
1− te)nc−le |ke, le − ke〉e]
}
(A5)
where ld and le denote the number of photons passing
the channel and finally arriving at David and Ethan. Af-
terwards, combined with channel misalignment {θ2, θ3},
the above joint state, i.e., |ld− kd, kd〉d⊗ |ke, le− ke〉e, is
given by
kd∑
id=0
ld−kd∑
jd=0
√(
ld − kd
jd
)(
kd
id
)
(−1)ld−kd−jd ×
(cos θ2)
kd+jd−id(sin θ2)ld+id−kd−jd |id + jd, ld − id − jd〉d
⊗
ke∑
ie=0
le−ke∑
je=0
√(
le − ke
je
)(
ke
ie
)
(−1)ke−ie ×
(cos θ3)
ie+le−ke−je(sin θ3)ke+je−ie |ie + je, le − ie − je〉e(A6)
Finally, by combining Eqs. (A5) and (A6), we can de-
rive the coefficient Cc in Eq. (A4). In simulation, we
assume that the channel transmittances and the polar-
ization misalignments of the 4 channels are identical56
4. Detection
|α′a〉, |α′b〉, and |φc〉 will finally interfere (Hong-Ou-
Mandel interference50) at David and Ethan. In Eq. (A4),
each one is a superposition of number states. Hence, the
overall HOM interference is the superposition of the in-
terference between all number states.
6Let us focus on one specific input number state (of BS),
interfering at David and Ethan:{|xa, ya〉 ⊗ |xd, yd〉}inDavid ⊗ {|xe, ye〉 ⊗ |xb, yb〉}inEthan
(A7)
In Z basis, considering |H〉 and |V 〉 mode separately,
we can derive the interference results (output of the two
beam splitters) using the method of Ref.57. For instance,
on David’s side, the interference for |H〉 mode is between
|xa〉port1−h and |xd〉port2−h, where the interference result
is given by a binomial distribution
xa∑
qa=0
xd∑
qd=0
(
xa
qa
)(
xd
qd
)√
(qa + qd)!
xa!xd!
×
√
(xa + xd − qa − qd)!t(qa+xd−qd)r(xa−qa+qd)
|qa + qd〉port3−h ⊗ |xa + xd − qa − qd〉port4−h
where t (r) is the transmission (reflection) coefficient of
BS satisfying r∗t + rt∗=0 and |r|2 + |t|2=1. Hence, the
coefficient of z photons in |H〉 mode populating out from
port3 of David’s BS, Cport3−h(z), is given by
xa∑
k=0
(
xa
k
)(
xd
z − k
)√
z!(xa + xd − z)!
xa!xd!
t(2k+xd−z)r(xa+z−2k)
where k ≤ z, (z − k) ≤ (xd), and z ∈ {0, 1, ..., (xa +
xd)}. Note that Cport3−h(z) is also the coefficient of xa+
xd− z photons populating out from port4 of David’s BS.
Similarly, we can get the interference result for |V 〉 mode,
i.e., between |ya〉port1−v and |yd〉port2−v.
At the same time, we can also derive the interference
result between |xe, ye〉c and |xb, yb〉b on Ethan’s side and
thus the joint interference result (4-fold coincidence) for
a given number state given by Eq. (A7).
By summing over all the number states given by
Eq. (A4), we can calculate the overall inference re-
sults. In our simulation, for each number state given by
Eq. (A7), we create a table to store the coefficients of dif-
ferent interference outputs. By adding the tables for all
number states (Eq. (A4)), we can have the summation
table containing the final coefficients of all interference
outputs. In the end, we can have the coincident detec-
tion probabilities by considering the detection efficiency
ηd of a threshold SPD
58.
5. Key rate
Based on the detection probabilities, we can derive the
gains i.e., QHHZ and Q
HV
Z , for different encodings by Al-
ice/Bob. Therefore, the overall gain and QBER in Z
basis are given by
QZ =
QHHZ +Q
HV
Z
2
EZ =
QHHZ
QHHZ +Q
HV
Z
In the asymptotic case, Q1,1Z is given by P
1,1Y 1,1Z ,
where P 1,1=µaµbe
−(µa+µb) denotes the single-single pho-
ton probability and Y 1,1Z denotes the yield, i.e., the con-
ditional probability that a successful event happens in Z
basis when Alice/Bob send single-photon state, which
can be derived by substituting Eq. (A2) by a perfect
single-photon source. In the finite decoy-state case59? ,
Q1,1Z is estimated from the quantifies of QZ for different
intensities. A similar discussion holds when Alice and
Bob use X basis for encoding, i.e., |+〉|+〉 and |+〉|−〉.
Thus, we can have the overall gain and QBER for X ba-
sis. In the asymptotic case, e1,1X can be calculated from
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